Anti Dumping and Competition Law in Egypt
In light of the challenges facing the Egyptian economy, there has been a growing demand to protect national industries from the influx of low-priced imports, whether resulting from dumping practices or global market fluctuations. Indeed, the Egyptian legislator, through Law No. 161 of 1998, has provided protective intervention tools, including safeguard duties, as a means to counter the serious harm that may affect local industries. However, these tools, if not managed within a transparent and balanced institutional framework, may lead to counterproductive outcomes — most notably undermining competition, weakening market dynamics, and deepening monopolistic structures under the guise of economic protection.
The Legal Framework in Egypt
Law No. 161 of 1998 and its executive regulations lay out mechanisms for imposing safeguard duties and anti-dumping and countervailing duties, based on the principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The law empowers the Ministry of Trade and Industry, through the Anti-Dumping and Subsidy Investigation Authority, to investigate and impose measures — whether temporary or final — if material injury or threat of injury to national industry is proven. However, in practice, these procedures often lack a comprehensive assessment of their market-wide impact, particularly regarding competition, consumer behavior, and supply diversity. This creates a regulatory gap that conflicts with the requirements of a free market.
Safeguard Duties as a Double-Edged Tool
While safeguard duties aim to protect local industries from harmful competition, if not tightly regulated, they can become a restrictive tool that undermines the principle of fair competition. They provide local producers with an artificial price advantage, without linking this to performance or efficiency improvements. They also weaken the competitive pressure necessary to drive quality, pushing import-dependent suppliers out of the market, which leads to concentrated supply, higher prices, and weakened innovation.
International Comparisons – Established Regulatory Practices
European Union – Institutional Governance and Periodic Review:
The European Union has a precise and transparent system for handling protective measures. Duties are only imposed after public investigations conducted by the European Commission, and affected parties — including importers and consumers — are granted the right to submit data and objections. European law also requires evidence that the protected industry has used the protection period for restructuring and improving efficiency; otherwise, the protection is automatically lifted. These decisions are subject to judicial review by the European Court of Justice, ensuring a balance between temporary protection and sustainable competition.
United States – Strict Separation of Authorities and Multi-Dimensional Investigations:
In the United States, authority is divided between the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), responsible for technical investigation, and the Department of Commerce, responsible for enforcement. The evaluation considers multiple aspects: including the impact of duties on the final consumer, market stability, and the extent of actual harm. Affected parties have the right to judicial appeal in federal courts, reinforcing accountability and oversight.
India – Broad Use of Duties Amid Weak Competitive Oversight
The Indian experience shows a notable expansion in the imposition of safeguard duties in response to local industry demands, in the absence of independent assessments of their impact on competition and prices. While India formally adheres to WTO procedures, in practice, application often favors local producers at the expense of consumers, traders, and importers. This has, in some sectors, resulted in administratively protected monopolistic situations.
The Situation in Egypt – Lack of Institutional Coordination and Conflicting Authorities
In Egypt, the main challenge lies in the absence of institutional linkage between trade protection policy and competition policy. Although the Egyptian Competition Authority holds legal powers under Law No. 3 of 2005, the mechanisms for imposing safeguard duties remain entirely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, without requiring coordination or technical consultation with the Competition Authority.
This separation creates a serious regulatory void, allowing protective decisions that fundamentally affect market balance to pass without independent evaluation of competitive impacts. In several cases, such measures have strengthened the dominance of large entities — some quasi-governmental or enjoying regulatory influence — thereby entrenching concealed monopolistic conditions under the banner of protection.
Moreover, the lack of rapid judicial review mechanisms or parliamentary consultation increases the difficulty of challenging or correcting decisions that may have long-term negative effects on the investment environment.
Recommendations for Reforming Protective Policy in Egypt
To ensure a balance between industry protection and competition enhancement, there is a need for a comprehensive reform of the legal and regulatory frameworks governing anti-dumping and safeguard measures, through:
- Amending Law No. 161 of 1998 to incorporate competitive impact assessments into investigation procedures.
- Requiring the Ministry of Trade to coordinate in advance with the Competition Authority before imposing any duties.
- Establishing a permanent independent committee to evaluate the multi-dimensional effects of protective measures, including representatives of concerned bodies and market economy experts.
Linking the imposition of duties to measurable industrial development plans, with periodic reviews of their effects on prices and competition.
Conclusion
Economic protection does not mean granting privileges but rather organizing competition within a fair and disciplined framework. Any policy imposed in the name of protection must be subjected to strict oversight, independent evaluation, and legal accountability, so it does not turn from a defensive tool into a means of disrupting the market. Successful international practices in this field remain evidence that true protection begins with decision-making transparency, institutional integration, and balancing the interests of producers, consumers, and competitors.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the purpose of Law No. 161 of 1998 in Egypt?
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Law No. 161 of 1998 aims to protect Egyptian industries from harm caused by low-priced imports through tools like safeguard and anti-dumping duties.
How are safeguard duties imposed in Egypt?
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Safeguard duties in Egypt are imposed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry after investigations by the Anti-Dumping and Subsidy Investigation Authority, based on World Trade Organization (WTO) principles.
What risks can result from poorly managed anti-dumping measures?
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If not properly regulated, anti-dumping measures can undermine competition, increase prices, reduce market innovation, and lead to monopolistic practices.
How does Egypt’s anti-dumping policy compare to the EU and US?
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The EU and US have transparent, multi-step procedures with checks and public consultations, while Egypt lacks such coordination and independent competitive impact assessments.
Why is coordination between trade protection and competition policy important?
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Coordination ensures that protective measures don’t harm market competition or create monopolies, balancing the interests of producers, consumers, and the economy.
What reforms are recommended for Egypt’s anti-dumping and safeguard laws?
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Recommended reforms include requiring competition impact assessments, prior coordination with the Competition Authority, and regular reviews of the effect of duties on the market.
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